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Autonomous agents are software agents that are self-contained, capable of making
independent decisions, and taking actions to satisfy internal goals based upon their
perceived environment. Agent negotiation is a means for autonomous agents to com-
municate and compromise to reach mutually beneficial agreements. By considering
the complexity of negotiation environments, agent negotiation can be classified into
three levels, which are the Bilateral Negotiation Level, the Multilateral Negotiation
Level, and the Multiple Related Negotiation Level.
In the Bilateral Negotiation Level, negotiations are performed between only two
agents. The challenges on this level are how to predict an opponent’s negotiation
behavior, and how to reach the optimal negotiation outcome when the negotiation
environment becomes open and dynamic. The contribution of this thesis on this
level is (1) to propose a regression-based approach to learn, analyze and predict the
opponent negotiation behaviors in open and dynamic environments based on the
historical records of the current negotiation; and (2) to propose a multi-issue nego-
tiation approach to estimate the opponent’s negotiation preference, and to search
for the bi-beneficial negotiation outcome when the opponent changes its negotiation
strategies dynamically.
In the Multilateral Negotiation Level, negotiations are performed among more
than two agents. Agents need more efficient negotiation protocols, strategies and
approaches to handle outside options as well as competitions. Especially when nego-
tiation environments become open and dynamic, future possible upcoming outside
options still need to be considered. The challenge in this level is how to guide agents
to efficiently and effectively reach agreements in highly open and dynamic negotia-
tion environments, such as e-marketplaces. The contribution of this thesis on this
level is (1) to propose a negotiation partner selection approach to filter out unex-
pected negotiation opponents before a multilateral negotiation starts; (2) to extend
v
a market-driven strategy for multilateral single issue negotiation in dynamic envi-
ronments by considering upcoming changes of the environment; and (3) to propose
a market-based strategy for multilateral multi-issue negotiation by considering both
markets situations and agents specifications.
In the Multiple Related Negotiation Level, several negotiations are processed to-
gether by agents in order to achieve a global goal. These negotiations are not abso-
lutely independent, but some how related. In order to ensure the global goal can be
efficiently achieved, factors such as the negotiation procedure, the success rate, and
the expected utility for each of these related negotiations should be considered. The
contribution of this thesis on this level is to introduce a Multi-Negotiation Network
(MNN) and a Multi-Negotiation Influence Diagram (MNID) to search for the opti-
mal policy to concurrently conduct the multiple related negotiation by considering
both the joint success rate and the joint utility.
vi
Acknowledgements
This work would not have been carried out so smoothly without the help, assistance
and support from a number of people. I would like to thank the following people:
∙ First and foremost, I offer my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, A/Prof.
Minjie Zhang, for her continuous support of my Ph.D study and research,
for her patience, motivation, enthusiasm, and immense knowledge. I have
benefited greatly from her never-failing source of support, and will never forget
the weekends she spent on discussions between us. I simply could not wish for
a better or friendlier supervisor.
∙ I gratefully acknowledge my co-supervisor Dr. Jun Yan for sharing his knowl-
edge without reservation, and for his patient guidance.
∙ I gratefully thank Prof. John Fulcher for his kind help on proof reading and
valuable suggestions to improve the quality of my reports, papers, as well as
this thesis.
∙ I would like thank Dr. Quan Bai for discussing various issues and for sharing
ideas with me. He made this period of hard work interesting and relaxing.
∙ I would like to give my appreciation to all general staff and IT staff in SCSSE
for their support to my Ph.D study.
∙ Last but not least, I wish to thank my parents and my wife for their endless
love, support and care throughout my degree. I cannot even make one step
forward without them. I love them all.
vii
Publications
The following is a list of my research papers that have been already published during
my PhD study that ends with the completion of this thesis.
Scholarly Book Chapters
1 Fenghui Ren and Minjie Zhang, Desire-Based Negotiation in Electronic Mar-
ketplaces. In Post-Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Agent-
based Complex Automated Negotiations (ACAN09), Innovations of Agent-based
Complex Automated Negotiations, (accepted in Jan. 2010), in press.
2 John Fulcher, Minjie Zhang, Quan Bai and Fenghui Ren, Discovery of Tele-
phone Call Patterns by the use of Intelligent Reasoning. In K. Nakamatsu
(Ed.), Handbook of Intelligent Reasoning, World Scientific, (accepted in Oct.
2008).
3 Mingjie Zhang, Quan Bai, Fenghui Ren and John Fulcher, Chapter IV:
Collaborative Agents for Complex Problem Solving. In C. Mumford and L.
Jain (Ed.), Computational Intelligence, Collaborative, Fusion and Emergence,
Springer, pp. 361-399, 2009.
4 Quan Bai, Fenghui Ren, Minjie Zhang and John Fulcher, Chapter 8: CPN-
Based State Analysis and Prediction for Multi-Agent Scheduling and Planning.
In T. Ito, M. Zhang, V. Robu, S. Fatima and T. Matsuo (Ed.), Advances
in Agent-Based Complex Automated Negotiation, Studies in Computational
Intelligence, Springer, Vol.233, pp. 161-176, 2009.
5 Fenghui Ren and Minjie Zhang, Chapter 12: The Prediction of Partners’
Behaviors in Self-Interested Agents. In M Yokoo, T. Ito, M. Zhang, J. Lee
and T. Matsuo (Ed.), Electronic Commerce: Theory and Practice. Studies in
Computational Intelligence, Springer, Vol. 110, Springer, pp. 157-170, 2008.
viii
Refereed Journal Articles
6 Fenghui Ren, Minjie Zhang and Kwang Mong Sim, Adaptive Conceding
Strategies for Automated Trading Agents in Dynamic, Open Markets. Deci-
sion Support Systems, Elsevier, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 704-716, 2009.
7 Quan Bai, Fenghui Ren, Minjie Zhang and John Fulcher, CPN-Based State
Analysis and Prediction for Multi-Agent Scheduling and Planning. In Multi-
agent and Grid Systems, International Transactions on Systems Science and
Applications, (accepted in Dec. 2009), in press.
8 Fenghui Ren, Minjie Zhang and John Fulcher, Expectation on Behaviour of
Trading Agent in Negotiation in Electronic Marketplace. Web Intelligence and
Agent Systems: An International Journal, (accepted in Nov. 2009), in press.
9 Fenghui Ren and Minjie Zhang, Prediction of Partners Behaviors in Agent
Negotiation under Open and Dynamic Environments. In International Trans-
actions on Systems Science and Applications, Vol 4, No. 2, pp. 295-304, 2008.
10 Fenghui Ren and Minjie Zhang, Partners Selection in Multi-Agent Systems
by Using Linear and Non-linear Approaches. In Transactions on Computa-
tional Sciences I, pp. 37-60, 2008.
11 Fenghui Ren, Minjie Zhang and Jun Yan, An Extended Dual Concern Model
for Partner Selection in Multi-agent Systems. In System and Information
Sciences Notes, Vol 1, No. 2, pp. 153-158, 2007.
Refereed Conference Papers
12 Fenghui Ren, Minjie Zhang, Chunyan Miao and Zhiqi Shen, A Market-Based
Multi-Issue Negotiation Model Considering Multiple Preferences in Dynamic
E-Marketplaces. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Prin-
ciples of Practice in Multi-Agent Systems(PRIMA09), pp. 1-16, 2009. (Best
Student Paper Award)
13 Fenghui Ren and Minjie Zhang, Optimal Multi-Issue Negotiation in Open
and Dynamic Environments. In PRICAI2008: Trends in Artificial Intelli-
gence, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, LNAI 5351, pp. 321-332,
2008.
ix
14 Fenghui Ren, Kwang Mong Sim and Minjie Zhang, Market-Driven Agents
with Uncertain and Dynamic Outside Options. In Proceedings of the Sixth In-
ternational Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
(AAMAS07), Honolulu, US, pp. 721-723, 2007.
15 Fenghui Ren and Minjie Zhang, Prediction Partners’ Behaviours in Nego-
tiation by Using Regression Analysis. In Proceedings of the Second Interna-
tional Conference on Knowledge Science, Engineering and Management, Lec-
ture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, LNAI 4798, Springer, pp. 165-179, 2007,
(Runner-up, Best Student Paper Award).
16 Fenghui Ren, Minjie Zhang and Quan Bai, A Fuzzy-Based Approach for
Partner Selection in Multi-Agent Systems. In Proceedings of the Sixth IEEE/
ACIS International Conference on Computer and Information Science, Mel-
bourne, Australia, pp. 457-462, 2007.
17 Quan Bai, Minjie Zhang and Fenghui Ren, A Colored Petri Net Based Ap-
proach for Flexible Agent Interactions. In Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE
International Conference in IT and Application, Harbin, China, pp. 186-191,
2007.
18 Fenghui Ren and Minjie Zhang, Prediction of Partners’ Behaviors in Agent
Negotiation under Open and Dynamic Environments. In Proceedings of 2007
IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelli-







1.1 A Personal View of Agents Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Agent Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 Environment Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.3 A Classification of Agent Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Research Issues and Challenges in Agent Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.1 Research Issues in Agent Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.2 Four Major Challenging Problems in Agent Negotiation . . . . 12
1.3 Motivation of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Contribution of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Organization of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2 Literature Review 20
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Bilateral Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.1 Bilateral Single Issue Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.2 Bilateral Multiple Issue Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Multilateral Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.1 Negotiation Partner Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.2 Multilateral Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Multi-Negotiation Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
xi
2.4.1 Multiple Related Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3 Agent Behavior Prediction in Bilateral Single Issue Negotiation 45
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 An Agent’s Behavior in Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Regression Analysis in Agent Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.1 Linear Regression Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.2 Power Regression Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.3 Quadratic Regression Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Opponent Behaviors Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5.1 Scenario 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5.2 Scenario 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.3 Scenario 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4 Optimization of Bilateral Multiple Issue Negotiation 69
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Historical-Offer Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.1 Complex Behaviors Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 Preference Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Optimal Offer Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.4.1 A Geometric Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4.2 An Algebraic Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5 Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.5.1 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.5.2 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5.3 Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5 Negotiation Partner Selection 97
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2 Potential Partners Analysis in General Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.2.1 The Extended Dual Concern Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
xii
5.2.2 Problem Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3 Partner Selection by Using a Linear Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4 Partner Selection by Using a Non-Linear Approach . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4.1 Framework of a Fuzzy-Based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4.2 Fuzzification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.4.3 Approximate Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.4.4 Defuzzification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.5 Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5.1 Scenario 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5.2 Scenario 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.5.3 Scenario 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.5.4 Scenario 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6 Market-Driven Strategy for Multilateral Single Issue Negotiation 119
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.2 A Model for Market-Driven Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.2.1 Principle of the MDAs Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.2.2 Trading Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.2.3 Trading Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.2.4 Trading Time and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.2.5 Eagerness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.2.6 Limitations of MDAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.3 MDAs with Uncertain and Dynamic Outside Options . . . . . . . . . 127
6.3.1 Trading Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.3.2 Trading Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.3.3 Trading Time and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.3.4 Eagerness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.4 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.4.1 Setup of Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.4.2 Experiment 1: Trading Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.4.3 Experiment 2: Trading Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.4.4 Experiment 3: Trading Time and Strategies . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.4.5 Experiment 4: Eagerness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
xiii
6.4.6 Experiment 5: Combining all factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7 Market-Based Strategy for Multilateral Multiple Issue Negotiation153
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
7.2 Market-Based Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.2.1 Issue Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.2.2 Negotiation Environment Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.2.3 Counter-Offer Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.2.4 Offer Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.2.5 Protocol and Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.3 Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
7.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
8 Multiple Related Negotiations 171
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
8.2 A Multi-Negotiation Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
8.2.1 Construction of A MNN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
8.2.2 Updating of a MNN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
8.3 Decision Making in a MNN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
8.3.1 Multi-Negotiation Influence Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
8.3.2 Four Typical Cases in a MNID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
8.4 Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
8.4.1 Experiment Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
8.4.2 Scenario A (a successful scenario) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8.4.3 Scenario B (an unsuccessful scenario) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
9 Conclusion and Future Work 193
9.1 Summary of Major Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193




3.1 Power function prediction results in S1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 Power function prediction results in S2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 Power function prediction results in S3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.1 Multiple quadratic regression functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 Negotiation parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3 Negotiation parameters for the study case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.4 Seller1 ’s preference and buyer1 ’s estimation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.5 Buyer1 ’s regression functions on seller1 ’s utility function. . . . . . . 91
5.1 Fuzzy rule base (ReliantDegree=Complete Self-Driven). . . . . . . . . 110
5.2 Fuzzy rule base (ReliantDegree=Self-Driven). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.3 Fuzzy rule base (ReliantDegree=Equitable). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4 Fuzzy rule base (ReliantDegree=External-Driven). . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.5 Fuzzy rule base (ReliantDegree=Complete External-Driven). . . . . . 112
5.6 Input parameters for Scenario 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.7 Output for Scenario 1 by using the linear function. . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.8 Output for Scenario 1 by using the non-linear function. . . . . . . . . 114
5.9 Input parameters for Scenario 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.10 Output for Scenario 2 by using the linear function. . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.11 Output for Scenario 2 by using the non-linear function. . . . . . . . . 115
5.12 Input parameters for Scenario 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.13 Output for Scenario 3 by using the linear function. . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.14 Output for Scenario 3 by using the non-linear function. . . . . . . . . 116
5.15 Input parameters for Scenario 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.16 Output for Scenario 4 by using the linear function. . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.17 Output for Scenario 4 by using the non-linear function. . . . . . . . . 117
xv
7.1 Experiment setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
8.1 The joint probability and utility for a general MNID. . . . . . . . . . 179
8.2 Expected utilities in typical cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
8.3 Parameters for mortgage negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8.4 Parameters for property negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
xvi
List of Figures
1.1 A nested view of general negotiation models [LS06]. . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Three levels hierarchical view of agent negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Negotiation decision functions for the buyer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 An example of Pareto optimal and equilibrium. . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1 Agents’ behaviors in negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 All Prediction results in S1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3 Power function prediction results in S1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Power function prediction results comparison in S1. . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5 Quadratic function prediction results in S1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Quadratic function prediction results comparison in S1. . . . . . . . . 59
3.7 All prediction results in S2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.8 Power function prediction results in S2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.9 Power function prediction results comparison in S2. . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.10 Quadratic function prediction results in S2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.11 Quadratic function prediction results comparison in S2. . . . . . . . . 64
3.12 All prediction results in S3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.13 Power function prediction results in S3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.14 Power function prediction results comparison in S3. . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.15 Quadratic function prediction results in S3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.16 Quadratic function prediction results comparison in S3. . . . . . . . . 68
4.1 An example of complex agent behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2 An example of multiple regression. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3 Lines A and B have an intersection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4 Lines A and B do not have an intersection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.5 The ratio of buyer1 ’s utility to buyer2 ’s utility. . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
xvii
4.6 The ratio of seller1 ’s utility by negotiating with buyer1 to seller1 ’s
utility by negotiating with buyer2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.7 The ratio of buyer1 ’s negotiation rounds to buyer2 ’s negotiation rounds. 89
4.8 The ratio of buyer1 ’s negotiation time to buyer2 ’s negotiation time. . 90
4.9 Buyer1 ’s estimation on seller1 ’s utility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.10 Buyer1 ’s view of the negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.11 Seller1 ’s view when negotiating with buyer1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.12 Utilities comparison between buyer1 and seller1. . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.13 Buyer2 ’s view of the negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.14 Seller1 ’s view when negotiating with buyer2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.15 Utilities comparison between buyer2 and seller1. . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.16 Buyer1 ’s optimal offer generation in the 8tℎ round. . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.1 The extended dual concern model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2 The framework of the non-linear partner selection approach. . . . . . 105
5.3 Fuzzy quantization of the range [0, 100] for GainRatio. . . . . . . . . 107
5.4 Fuzzy quantization of the range [0, 100] for ContributionRatio. . . . . 107
5.5 Fuzzy quantization of the range [0∘, 90∘] for ReliantDegree. . . . . . . 109
5.6 Fuzzy quantization of range [0, 100] for CollaborationDegree. . . . . . 110
6.1 A nested view of general negotiation models [LGS06]. . . . . . . . . . 121
6.2 Modeling different rates of concession. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.3 Trading opportunity when partners enter freely. . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.4 Trading opportunity when partners leave freely. . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.5 Trading opportunity when partners enter and leave freely. . . . . . . . 139
6.6 Trading competition when partners enter freely. . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.7 Trading competition when partners leave freely. . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.8 Trading competition when partners enter and leave freely. . . . . . . . 142
6.9 Trading competition when competitors enter freely. . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.10 Trading competition when competitors leave freely. . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.11 Trading competition when competitors enter and leave freely. . . . . . 144
6.12 Trading competition when both partners and competitors enter and
leave freely. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.13 Trading strategy when partners enter freely. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.14 Trading strategy when partners leave freely. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.15 Trading strategy when partners enter and leave freely. . . . . . . . . . 147
xviii
6.16 Trading strategy when competitors enter freely. . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.17 Trading strategy when competitors leave freely. . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.18 Trading strategy when competitors enter and leave freely. . . . . . . . 149
6.19 Trading strategy when both partners and competitors enter and leave
freely. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.20 Eagerness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.21 Combine all factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7.1 Negotiators’ responses to markets’ situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.2 Counter-offer generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.3 Counter-offer generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.4 Counter-offer generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.5 Negotiation in an equitable market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.6 Negotiation in a beneficial market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.7 Negotiation in a inferior market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.8 Trading surface of negotiation models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
8.1 A Multi-Negotiation Network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
8.2 Multi-Negotiation Network update. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
8.3 A Multi-Negotiation Influence Diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
8.4 The MNN and MNID for the experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
8.5 Mortgage negotiation using NDF approach for Scenario A. . . . . . . 184
8.6 Property negotiations using NDF approach for Scenario A. . . . . . . 184
8.7 Success rate of mortgage negotiation for Scenario A. . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.8 Utility of mortgage negotiation for Scenario A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.9 Success rate of property negotiation for Scenario A. . . . . . . . . . . 186
8.10 Utility of property negotiation for Scenario A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
8.11 Expected utilities for both mortgage and property negotiation for
Scenario A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
8.12 Mortgage negotiation using NDF approach for Scenario B. . . . . . . 188
8.13 Mortgage negotiation using NDF approach for Scenario B. . . . . . . 189
8.14 Success rate of mortgage negotiation for Scenario B. . . . . . . . . . . 190
8.15 Utility of mortgage negotiation for Scenario B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
8.16 Success rate of property negotiation for Scenario B. . . . . . . . . . . 191
8.17 Utility of property negotiation for Scenario B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
xix
8.18 Expected utilities for both mortgage and property negotiation for
Scenario B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
xx
